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Veblen’s work contains a neglected, since for the most part implicit, theory of recognition centred on his concepts of waste and workmanship. This article tries to develop this theory in order to shed new light on the theorem of conspicuous leisure and consumption. The legitimacy of violence at the ‘predatory stage’ of culture has been partly superseded by a legitimacy of industrial efficiency, so that the leisure classes need to guise their conspicuous waste as socially useful productive endeavours. At the same time waste remains a powerful symbol of legitimate status, so that even the industrial classes turn to it in order to assert their social worth and demand social recognition. Waste – which is far more central in Veblen’s theory than is emulation – becomes an ambiguous symbol which can stand for both unproductive privilege and industrial efficiency. The utilitarian urge for efficiency and the meaninglessness of a struggle for recognition through conspicuous waste produce a desire for a romantic escape, also acknowledged by Veblen, but often overlooked over in his sharp criticism of consumerism.
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Introduction
Veblen’s significance for the theory of consumer capitalism is widely seen as resting in his analysis of the positional function of consumption, the consumption of status goods (e.g. Slater, 1997: 154ff., Corrigan 1997: 21ff.). But while his analysis of ‘conspicuous’ leisure and consumption has been admired for its sophistication, the bluntness of some of his basic assumptions has been criticized as it allegedly made him overlook other motives involved in consumerism (Riesman, 1953: 55, more recently Campbell, 1987: 50ff.; 1990). Due to his main line of attack against the dominant nouveaux riche culture of his time he may indeed have overemphasized practices of ‘conspicuous consumption’, pitting socially useful industry against wasteful leisure. However, Veblen has acknowledged a much more complex relationship between leisure, consumption, and work than might appear at first sight. This relationship is centred, I will argue, on the issue of recognition in the emphatic Hegelian sense of acknowledgement (Hegel 1931: 229ff.). A re-examination of Veblen’s arguments will, I think, add a new perspective to the recent debate around the importance of recognition and its relation to the distribution of power and wealth (e.g. Honneth 2001, Fraser 2000). 
Waste
With his Theory of the Leisure Class Veblen (1994) has, in 1899, provided one of the first consistent accounts of modern consumerism. In his view, there are two driving forces behind the dynamics of the ever expanding market for consumer goods. He begins with the principle of emulation. In a society where wealth is distributed unequally and where this wealth determines one’s place in the social hierarchy, people reassure themselves of their social standing by living up to their respective classes’ ‘pecuniary canons of taste’ (Veblen, 1994: 31). He also discerns a tendency of lower classes to copy their ‘betters’ while striving to advance socially. Upper class habits of comportment and consumption will thereby trickle down to lower classes, especially as industrial progress makes the goods used for distinction cheaper. This stimulates a dynamics in which the emulated classes develop ever more expensive and elaborated patterns of taste in order to guard their position against aspiring rising groups.
Most criticisms of Veblen are levelled against this assumption of emulation as central driver of the development of consumer culture (Haight 1997) since it ignores lower class creativities (Willis 1980) as well as processes of reverse emulation, trickle-up effects (e.g. Bourdieu 1979: 259). It also ignores the diversity of consumer culture in assuming one monolithic dominant upper class culture. And, as Campbell (1987: 50ff.) shows, the theorem of emulation fails to explain the historical emergence of consumer culture. 
I will not discuss these issues in this article; what is important for my argument here is that emulation is not the central element of Veblen’s analyses of consumption. As Ramstad (1998) shows, a falsification of the emulation thesis would only slightly affect the validity of Veblen’s theory. Its core concept is not emulation but waste (Ramstad 1998: 23, Saram 1999: 236) – Veblen (1994: 85) has made it clear that both the utility of conspicuous consumption and the reputability gains from emulation depend upon ‘the element of waste’. The crucial criterion for the verification of status claims is ‘evidence of pecuniary ability to afford a life of idleness’ (Veblen, 1994: 43). Monetary wealth has to materialize in order to be of any symbolic use, ‘for esteem is awarded only on evidence.’ (1994: 36) Conspicuous waste proves that one does not need to work productively for a living, that one has enough financial means at disposal to make others spend their productive time for one’s own luxurious wants – hence, for example, the ‘superiority of hand-wrought goods’ (Veblen 1994: 159): they just incorporate more, if unnecessary, labour. The extent to which one is able to abstain from labour together with the amount of other people’s labour one can buy measures the extent of social esteem one has claim to. 
The significance of practices of waste does, therefore, not just lie in the construction of symbolic systems of distinction but first of all in the communication of the material basis of underlying class differences. Veblen did not establish, as Rojek (1995: 76) suggests, a ‘bifurcation between material and symbolic power’ and he did not think that ‘to be recognized as a member of the elect it is enough to demonstrate superficial familiarity with the mannerisms and the rituals of dominant class membership.’ On the contrary, the symbolism is designed to provide evidence of wealth. Luxury demonstrates wealth – and at the same time it is wealth: a real waste of real labour. Waste is a symbol, not a metaphor.
There are two major ways of demonstrating abstinence from useful labour. The first is conspicuous leisure, idleness for all to see. Refined techniques of conspicuous leisure do not just document current non-labour but a continuous abstention from industrial occupations – they produce durable evidence of long-term non-productivity, ‘some tangible, lasting result of the leisure so spent’ (Veblen, 1994: 43). Ramstad (1998: 17) applies this to contemporary lifestyles revolving round sport cultures like triathlon or surfing where ‘a high level of performance is itself objective evidence that one has previously “wasted” enormous blocks of time (in training or practising)’. 
Even the richest cannot, of course, waste more than their whole life. One way of transcending this natural limit to idleness is vicarious leisure, leisure by stand-in idlers (Veblen, 1994: 66). This category includes, for instance, the entertainment of guests and surplus personnel, lackeys without real function. 
The second way of performing waste is conspicuous consumption, the consumption of goods that fulfil no specific reproductive or productivity-enhancing function but only incorporate and symbolize great pecuniary value. Strictly speaking, this is a special case of vicarious leisure, as one indirectly spends other people’s time on the production of otherwise useless status symbols. As the best known aspect of Veblen’s theory it hardly needs any explanation – everybody could easily add further examples to the Great Gatsby’s loudly yellow Rolls Royce. 
As mentioned before, the emphasis on conspicuous leisure and consumption, on the demonstration of status, has drawn strong criticism. Campbell points out that this approach totally seems to deny the relevance of both individual pleasure seeking and the maintenance of self-images. As an alternative Campbell (1990: 42) proposes an ‘approach from character’, in which 
to the extent that conduct is conscious and willed it is also perceived by the acting individual as ethical or moral; as, in effect, ‘justifiable’. This is indeed a defining characteristic of action with individuals reluctant to engage in acts which they cannot satisfactorily justify to themselves. 
Instead of discussing whether Veblen’s theory can be upheld against such criticism I will go on to show that such an approach from character already is, at least to an extent, present in Veblen’s reasoning. One use of conspicuous consumption actually is ‘in building up and preserving one’s self-complacency’ (Veblen 1994: 37). On the other hand it will also become clear, I hope, that an approach from character necessarily needs to acknowledge the importance of social recognition, a social self that is dramatically downplayed by Campbell and which to reinstate Veblen is a good starting point for (Boden and Williams 2002: 504). 
Veblen constructs the function of conspicuous consumption and leisure as a means of acquiring recognition. Frequently, Veblen talks of ‘esteem’, ‘reputability’, even ‘honour’ – and, in consequence, ‘self-esteem’, ‘self-respect’ and ‘self-assertion’ obtained by ‘invidious comparison’ as ‘process of valuation of persons in respect of worth’ (1994: 34). Conspicuous waste does not only draw social borders. It is not only the central technique in what Bourdieu (1979: 559ff.) later on is to call ‘la lutte des classements’, the cognitive aspect of class struggle; it also claims recognition – an aspect Bourdieu does not discuss at all (cf. Honneth 1984). 
Waste as a marker of distinction can only work if it is accepted and even valued by one’s equals and particularly by those who are in a lower position and in whom it is designed to instil deference; but for such an endeavour to succeed, the basis of legitimacy must be symbolized. Veblen offers different and seemingly contradicting explanations of how conspicuous waste works as a technique of gaining recognition. 
The first is that waste demonstrates honour in the sense of ‘predatory prowess’, as outcome and prima facie evidence of ‘successful acts of aggression’ (Veblen, 1994: 17). Veblen relates practices of waste to the supremacy of a warlike ‘barbaric’ culture that prevailed over its peaceful ‘savage’ predecessor roughly around the end of the Neolithic Revolution (1914: 126f.) and from there stretches into Modernity. While the savage community was guided by the ‘parental bent’ – a concern for the welfare of the community and particularly for future generations leading to ideals of harmonious productive cooperation – barbaric culture is guided by a ‘pecuniary bent’ (1914: 179), an urge to fare better in comparison to others by whatever means, preferentially violence. What is considered as ‘worthy’ here is the ability to defeat and exploit others. Personal wealth and leisure time count as evidence for this ability (1994: 8). Although capitalism, which Veblen portrayed as a neo-barbaric culture, is a pacified version of barbarity, in essence it is still based on exploitation and, ultimately, is founded on violent appropriation of time and matter. It is the recognition of supreme violent force – the demonstration of the capability to force others into serving their needs and wants – which upper class consumers link back to when using up other people’s labour; occupying other people’s time without themselves productively contributing to the social good. 
Often the underlying aggressive act of appropriation itself will be symbolized in the act of waste. Veblen exemplifies this by his famous interpretation of the gentleman’s walking stick as a sublimated weapon rather than actual help with walking (Veblen 1994: 264f.). Today, one might ask if not a BMW’s aggressive ‘face’ is not designed to meet exactly this purpose. The essence of these practices is intimidation by drawing attention to the violence that could be mobilized in defence of the privileges. 
What holds the (in Veblenian terms:) industrial classes in check is not so much the actual superior physical strength of their masters, but their own lack of prowess, their peacefulness. With Hegel (1931: 237) one might say that the fear of death is the crucial characteristic of the oppressed. In Hegel’s theory, it is the lord’s readiness to put his life at stake (i.e. prowess), vis-à-vis the bondsman’s failure to do so, that earns him recognition. Much of the upper class wealth nowadays is still being justified as an outcome of entrepreneurial risk-taking – pecuniary prowess. By outdoing others in wasteful consumption the booty of exploitation is displayed as evidence of a superior force. Veblen sees this as a continuation of an archaic ‘barbaric’ mode of status assertion into modern times. What is recognized in this process is the superior claim to social wealth – a wealth that according to Veblen is truly social as it consists mainly of the joint effort of present and past generations (Veblen 1914). Recognition is actualized in the very act of individuals wasting social resources without society stepping in to prevent it. 
Barbaric appropriation, however, is transformed in the age of machine industry and business (Veblen, 1914: 299ff., 1958). The predatory character of acquisition, the threat and actualization of violence is shifted more and more into the background. But a recollection of it remains engraved in the mere fact of modern private property as, in the last consequence, emerging from ‘primitive’ or ‘original accumulation’. Marx (1993: 460) notes that the bourgeois attempts to portray this initial appropriation as the result of work and thrift rather than of theft and robbery ‘demonstrate a guilty conscience’ – a repressed memory of the past acts violence the present peaceful market society is built on. Unlike Marx, who sees original accumulation pushed into oblivion, Veblen focuses on the ongoing processes of expropriation and predation and their symbolization. But the fact that these, too, cause a guilty conscience as ‘ostensibly purposeless leisure has come to be depreciated’ (Veblen 1994: 95) indicates that there is another, maybe more important source of legitimacy and recognition in modern capitalism that produces a moral grammar at odds with the one emerging from life-and-death struggles for resources and recognition. 
Industry
The tendency towards conspicuous waste is refracted by other cultural tendencies, notably by what Veblen (1994: 93; 1914) calls the ‘instinct of workmanship,’ the congenital urge to work conscientiously, cooperatively, and for the good of the community. Although he locates this ‘instinct’ mainly in the ‘industrial classes’, Veblen observes a ‘contamination’ of the modern leisure class by it, which sets them apart from the old aristocracies (1994: 93). This affects, first of all, the way conspicuous leisure and consumption are conducted. The instinct of workmanship is conceptualized as an ambivalent drive. It urges the efficient and diligent use of resources, originally to the service of the community. But as it is intrinsically contentless it also supports, according to Veblen (1914: 31), all other purposes: Even where the purpose is conspicuous waste this purpose tends to be pursued in a workmanlike manner. So, for example, while in Veblen’s (1994: 154f.) view sports is, ultimately, a practice of conspicuous leisure and conveys predatory values like competition and confrontation, in the build-up for the contest industrious training efforts are made, combining ‘ulterior wastefulness and proximate purposefulness’. Through this display of ‘workmanlike’ virtues within wasteful activities, however, a competing principle of legitimacy betrays itself, the honour of labour, whose humiliation Veblen laments.
A second tendency, which puts the assumed continuity of old ‘barbaric’ and the new ‘pecuniary’ aristocracies even more in question, is that many of the wasteful efforts are spent on activities which, seemingly, have a productive purpose (such as garden work or sewing) or advance the collective good (such as charity). Although Veblen (1994: 346ff.) denounces even charity as non-productive or even counter-productive display of abundant wealth, the very claim to utility testifies to a constraint to disguise waste. The leisure class plays to ambiguous requirements; there is an ‘uneasy reaching-out for some form of purposeful activity that shall at the same time not be indecorously productive for either individual or collective gain’ (Veblen 1994: 94). To take, again, the example of sports, it is not just the wasteful celebration of warlike virtues pursued in a workmanlike manner – it also (not without some justification) lays claim on being a useful training for work, e.g. through the acquisition of dexterity and strength or intangible assets like discipline and team spirit – or simply as ‘recreation’ of labour power. 
The leisure class thus apparently cannot practise their waste openly to its full extent; they mitigate their habits and develop ‘more delicate methods of expressing the same fact’ – the fact of habitual uselessness (Veblen, 1994: 186). This leads the Veblenesque consumer to develop a refinement which, as Trigg (2001: 108f.) argues, is by no means less subtle than the cultural consumption described by Bourdieu. If quasi-predatory prowess cannot be shown openly it simply cannot be the sole base for upper-class legitimacy. But, as Veblen (1994: 270) asks, ‘why are apologies needed?’  Why such strain, why this need to display utility in waste if waste is a means to acquire recognition?
An answer may be found in the way Veblen treats different classes in relation to waste. In the Theory of the Leisure Class he is mainly interested in the new ‘aristocracy’ who live like the old nobility on rents and who, if at all, busy themselves with ‘government, warfare, religious observances, and sports’ (Veblen 1994: 2). But although he obviously saw them as a significant new class, nowhere did he claim that they are the dominant class other than in terms of culture.
In the case of the ruling class proper, the business class, the tribute to work and industry is much more significant. Rojek (2000) confronts Veblen’s theory with the fact that the wealthiest people today hardly can be pictured as members of a leisure class. To the contrary, they habitually overwork themselves. This must have been the case already in Veblen’s own time though. Contrary to what Rojek implies Veblen does not ignore this, as he observes that 
‘no class of men have ever bent more unremittingly to their work than the modern business community. Within the business community there is properly speaking no leisure class, or at least no idle class.’ (1914: 226)
Although, as Wenzler (1998: 550ff.) points out, Veblen’s business class shares many of the leisure-class values, Veblen here explicitly defines them as a non-leisure class. They are devoted to work not only in terms of action but also in terms of justification. Business leaders tend to make a great deal of the fact that they work much longer hours than the average employee, complementing conspicuous waste with ‘conspicuous exhaustion’ (Haight 1997: 33). 
Establishing a distinction between ‘industrial and pecuniary employments’ (1990: 279ff.) Veblen nonetheless contests the business class’s claim to productivity and efficiency. Financial success and industrial efficiency, he asserts, follow different logics. The former is geared to individual enrichment, no matter whether by enhancing or inhibiting industrial productivity. Although in many cases finance driven management may increase industrial productivity, in other situations the profit logic may require outright sabotage (1963: 41ff. 1990: 343). But this does not keep the business class from justifying their incomes as rewards for productivity enhancing employments, as ‘wage of supervision’. This is facilitated by habituation as ‘the all-pervading preoccupation with pecuniary matters in modern times has led to its being accounted the type of workmanlike endeavour.’ (1914: 227) 
Against this legitimation Veblen contends that it is, in the first place, impossible to attribute a just share of the product even to the industrially employed (i.e. workers and engineers), due to the collective nature of the process of production and the achievements of earlier generations that have gone into the state of the industrial arts (1914: 103). Even less, he states, is it possible to justify the income of businessmen whose efforts are not unambiguously directed towards industrial efficiency, so that in the end 
‘there is no warrant […] for claiming that the work of highly paid persons (more particularly that of highly paid business men) is of greater substantial use to the community than that of the less highly paid.’ (1990: 304)
Nevertheless, businessmen gain their legitimacy from such claims drawing on the fact that ‘the competition runs in terms of money, and the money unit is the standard measure of efficiency and achievement’ (1914: 218). 
Reference to work, meritocratic contribution, does not mean, however, that the business community, the managerial class and the middle classes in general do abstain from conspicuous leisure and consumption. For Veblen (1994: 80ff.) the habitual denial of the bourgeois woman’s work in the household is a form of vicarious leisure in which the wife realizes the overworked husband’s entitlement to waste. One may interpret the current re-definition of child-rearing as pure enjoyment and self-actualization (Coward 1993: 80) in a similar way, and Riesman (1953: 180f.) applies the same reasoning to contemporary excessive spending on children. Still, all this conspicuous leisure and consumption ‘refers backwards to all the labour that has gone into working for the money to be spent.’ (Miller 1998: 94) Business-class big spending simultaneously demonstrates power over less rewarded producers and points to the allegedly supreme productivity behind the attribution of that power.
Veblen (1958: 40ff.) interprets this symbolical link between productive contribution and spending as an ongoing ideological dominance of  the theory of  Natural Rights, justifying private property by the owner’s input of labour, in which society is conceived as ruled by a social contract prescribing the reciprocal exchange of equal contributions. He explains this as a remnant of the ‘era of handicraft’ in which the artisan still combined industrial efficiency in the production of his goods and business skills for their marketing (1914: 212). 
In a ‘pecuniary society’ the money unit is the sole measure for efficiency and productivity, vested with an air of objectivity by the non-personal mechanism of the market. In a phenomenological inversion of Marx’s labour theory of value, it could be said that in everyday experience it seems as if work is remunerated in proportion to its efficiency because ‘in the form and through the equalization of things, products of labor’ in the market there also appears to be an ‘equalization of labor’ and hence an objective comparison of its value (Rubin 1972: 99).
 Therefore, as long as distribution does not run totally contrary to productive efforts and as long as the business class are credited with a high ‘multiplication factor’ for the value of their work, the assumption of just remuneration demonstrated in conspicuous consumption and leisure may retain its plausibility. In this context, then, conspicuous consumption does not or at least not only demonstrate pecuniary prowess but refers to supreme efficiency displayed in industrial efforts justifying high incomes.
More immediately, much consumption does not only refer back to work but is performed as if to enhance productivity, as reproduction and production of labour power. What Veblen would have seen as blunt conspicuous consumption may be understood – at least by those who perform it – as (quite literally) re-creation of their labour power. They 
really ‘need’ a second car or second holiday in order to work more efficiently and thereby save time and money in the long term, while the unemployed  don’t really ‘need’ that pint in the local or variety in their diet. (Miller 1998: 58)
The ethos of the business class unites work ethic and conspicuous waste in many ways pointing to an uneasy coexistence of the two competing principles of legitimacy, with an ideological priority given to workmanship. The main role of conspicuous waste seems to be its reference to work: as evidence for superior industrial efficiency and as conspicuous reproduction of labour power. 
After all, legitimacy solely based on prowess remains fragile, open to attack since – as an earlier critic of consumerism put it – ‘if others took from them by force what they themselves had gained by force, they would have no reason to complain’ (Rousseau 1993: 97). Constantly having to prove their prowess, the position of the leisure and business classes is always under threat, especially when the industrial classes begin to lose their awe and display some prowess themselves.

This leads us to consider conspicuous leisure and consumption in the industrial and especially the working classes, which Veblen does not understand solely as an expression of individual status aspirations by emulation of middle class behaviour, but also as claims to recognition for a collective contribution. He provides an example by analyzing Labour Day as vicarious leisure honouring the working classes in a rather ironic act: 
This observance is designed to augment the prestige of the fact of labour, by the archaic, predatory method of a compulsory abstention from useful effort. To this datum of labour-in-genera is imputed the good repute attributable to the pecuniary strength put in evidence by abstaining from labour. (1994: 310) 
The bondsmen in their quest for recognition use the symbolic weaponry of the lords. What they want to have acknowledged surely is industrial performance, but that it is recognized is due to their readiness to fight class struggles, from strikes to more violent forms of rebellion. Just as the high remunerations of the managerial classes appear not just as results of prowess but express industrial efficiency, the workers have to emphasize their prowess in order to gain recognition of their industrial efforts. 
This is also reflected in individual behaviour, such as rituals of ‘dram-drinking, “treating,” and smoking in public places’ (Veblen 1994: 89), in which the wage is transferred into wasteful activities that not only earn the respect of one’s peers but also function to reaffirm personal worth based on industrial employment. In order to instil such self-esteem, working-class consumer behaviour needs to be wasteful, non- or even counterproductive: tiring, unhealthy, dangerous, and often more bragging than the seemingly reproductive, rather ‘inconspicuous consumption’ (Whyte 1958: 312ff.) of the ‘organization man’ higher up the corporate hierarchies. With wastefulness being the ultimate proof of legitimate status, the ability to display luxury (however humble it may be) becomes as important as increases in the quality of life itself. As main motive of socialism Veblen (1990: 391) identifies a ‘feeling of injured justice’ which is ‘not always distinguishable from envy’. This feeling results from working-class invidious comparisons which assign to commodities and time ‘value as a means of respectability quite independent of, and out of proportion to, their simple utility as a means of livelihood.’ (1990: 395) 
The price for social peace in a system characterized by unequal distribution and envy is the recognition of productive industrial labour, i.e. the open admission of a second principle of legitimacy, since
… the usufruct of this productive capacity of the community and its trained workmen vests in the owners of the material equipment only with the contingent qualification that if the community does this work it must be allowed a livelihood, whereby the gross returns that go in the first instance to these owners suffer abatement by that much. This required livelihood is adjusted to a conventional standard of living which, under the current circumstances of pecuniary emulation, is in great part – perhaps chiefly – a standardized schedule of conspicuous waste. (Veblen 1914: 219)
While the leisure classes need to justify their waste through would-be work and would-be usefulness, the working classes utilize conspicuous waste as a technique to demonstrate the legitimacy of their position, driving up what Marx (1996: 181) calls the ‘historic and moral element’ in the value of labour power. 

Although Veblen has spent most of his analytical energy on neo-barbarism, it emerges that he has seen two competing strains of legitimacy in modern capitalism: pecuniary prowess and industry. Having acknowledged both, the latter does not need to be re-introduced into his thought as a ‘Weberian complication’ (Haight 1997: 34). Furthermore, Veblen allows for a complex interplay between those themes: They are not only frequently mixed and traded off against each other, but pecuniary prowess is also used to claim legitimacy for industrial efficiency and the latter may be exhibited in order to justify what really is the result of risky business transactions, sheer luck, exploitation etc. Even the most ruinous sacrificial dépense (Bataille 1967) can refer back to efforts of production and reproduction whose results go up in smoke in the act of waste (Miller 1998: 95ff.). Capitalism plays both tunes as it is, in ethical terms, built on both the promise of fortune, the logic of success, and the promise of rewarding productive effort, desert (Neckel 2001). Modern consumer-citizens find themselves on both sides, although maybe not to the same extent. As in the consumer-capitalist social contract the lord/bondsman relation is gradually diluted and generalized (Kojève 1968: 168), everybody can experience her- or himself in the role of the lord – governing the labour of others as sovereign consumer –, the price being that one must also join the ranks of the bondsmen in order to acquire the financial means for the temporary lordly mode of existence.

Veblen seems to side with industrial efficiency, with utility, condemning invidious comparison and waste; but he proves the frequent perception as ‘productionist’ (e.g. Rojek 1995) high priest of efficiency wrong by also acknowledging more romantic motives in modern consumerism. He was, indeed, rather sceptical about a world governed by productivity imperatives. The ‘utility’ he promoted never was efficiency for its own sake but always tied to social rationality (Tilman 1999: 97), human happiness, so that industrial efficiency could become a means to transcend productionism.
Romantic leisure and consumption 
In much of Veblen’s writing there is a romantic longing for authentic forms of social exchange and simpler forms of life – quite similar to that inspiring Rousseau’s Discourses or Henry Thoreau’s retreat to the woods. Both the conspicuous consumers’ derivational existence solely as ‘figment of someone else’s imagination’ (Waller/Robertson 1998: 29) and the technologically ‘superinduced mechanical regularity of life’ (Veblen 1958: 13) excite a longing back to a more natural way of life
which shall in some fashion afford an escape from the unending ‘grind’ of living from day to day by the machine method and shall so put behind us for a season the burdensome futilities by help of which alone life can be carried on under the routine of the machine process. (Veblen 1914: 319)
Even though he did not give much room to it in his works, he identifies a form of non-productive leisure that is not aimed at making an impression but at finding a way of live more appropriate to human nature. Certainly, in the Industrial Republic, with business interests eliminated and the organization of productive processes handed over to a ‘Soviet of Technicians’ (Veblen 1963),  production would, according to Veblen, be much more efficient. But like in early Soviet theory (e.g. Lenin 1972), socialist rationalization of industrial work, e.g. the adoption of Taylorism, should not be used to produce ever more of ever less needed goods – to the contrary, it was meant to reduce working hours. As the Veblenian socialist Upton Sinclair (1907: 221) puts it, ‘in a case of overproduction the workingman would be, not out of work, but on vacation’. In the Industrial Republic free time would be more significant than money in order to create ‘democratic leisure’ (Cross 1993: 126), innocent luxury for everybody: playtime, and time for ‘idle curiosity’ (Diggins 1978: 78ff.).
Adorno (1941: 402f.), consequently, discerns two types of luxury in Veblen: One is waste that is stage-managed in order to leave an impression and humiliate others; the other is the dreamy counter-image to machine-like serviceability, true pleasure in fulfilling one’s needs and wants without the competitive pressure to mark a social position. Veblen’s vision was the elimination of conspicuous waste while preserving non-utilitarian pleasure seeking and human fulfilment. 
But Adorno (1941: 403) objects that ‘the happiness that man actually finds cannot be severed altogether from conspicuous consumption’ – being seen happy is part of the pleasure. Even romantic consumerism as described by Campbell (1987), manipulating emotional experiences and exploring possible selves can, as a capitalist phenomenon, not be understood as a successful counter-project to conspicuous consumption. One reason is that romantic consumerism is, in effect, a form of conspicuous consumption. An evasion is only to be had in the form of waste and be it only negatively through the retreat from industry. Elsewhere Veblen (1994: 137) analyzes the ‘predilection for the rustic and the “natural” in parks’ as yet another refinement in the display of wealth. The meaning may in many cases not be the message: The last thing the romantic consumer intends is a mere symbolization of social standing. But, guided by whatever motives, the romantic consumer as daydreaming autonomous hedonist nevertheless inadvertently communicates a certain remoteness from the coercion to labour. He or she can afford to engage in unproductive daydreaming: 
What is universally ignored is Veblen’s insight that emulation may work its effect primarily at a second remove – that ‘image,’ ‘fantasy self,’ and so on, are constituted by means of consumption expenditures that may give vent to invidious expensiveness without (necessarily) an awareness that this is the case. (Ramstad, 1998: 16)
Romantic motives and messages about status can go hand in hand. Even ‘voluntary simplicity’ (Etzioni 1998), i.e. the renunciation of the comforts offered by modern consumerism in the name of a more authentic and sustainable lifestyle, can be read as status consumption – to be voluntarily simple presupposes the ability to afford a much less simple lifestyle.
Ultimately romantic and status motives are not to be separated neatly, because even the most wildly romantic project of the self is to be realized within a society that is used to reading status significance into individual lifestyles. In turn, even Campbell’s romantic consumer needs an audience for her or his self-expression; otherwise expression simply would not make any sense at all.​[1]​ Here the semantics of conspicuous waste suggests itself as a handy means to communicate such self-actualization. As Brown (1998: 52) observes, self-development 
is now subject to the same status considerations that Veblen examined with respect to pecuniary prowess. Just as Veblen talks about invidious and conspicuous consumption and leisure, society now validates invidious and conspicuous self-development. 
And finally, even the romantic consumer cannot always avoid references to legitimacy from industrial productivity and an occasional bow to the Protestant work ethic. Not only may elements of both ‘Romantic’ and of ‘Puritan’ ethics find their spatially and temporally separated places in the lives of modern consumers/workers, being integrated into a 'purito-romantic' personality system (Campbell, 1987: 223); the discourse of human resource management tries to vest romantic self-realization in the workplace (Vaughan, 1994). And in the afore-used example of sports, elements of a romantic return to a natural, corporeal self and industry seem to be inseparable:
Modern sport, one might say, attempts to restore to the body a part of the functions it has been deprived of through the machine. This attempt however, is made in order to train men the more inexorably to serve the machine. Sport virtually transforms the body itself into a kind of machine. (Adorno 1941: 395)  

Conclusion
In Veblen’s work two sources of recognition can be identified: pecuniary prowess, success, and industrial efficiency, desert, both feeding into the ambivalent moral grammar of modern capitalism. Both re-establish symbolical links between consumption and production that seemingly have been severed. As e.g. in Baudrillard (1970) there is a general tendency in the theorization of consumerism to suggest a dissociation of consumption and production. Consumerism may support and extend the discipline of the order of production with which it is inevitably entangled (1970: 29), but it develops its own logic in which the fact that the consumed is something produced is obscured. Commodities seem to emerge, like the godsends in the Melanese cargo cult, from some unfathomable miraculous source (1970: 27f.).
In the case of the leisure-class mode of recognition – wastefulness based on prowess – it might appear that the magic mentality of the consumer attested by Baudrillard and others is appropriate: the wasted goods are dissociated from their production and are charismatically attracted by their affluent consumers like the copper plates used in potlatch. But it becomes clear immediately when looking at the content of legitimacy communicated in wasteful consumption that its recognition value lies in the fact that it consists in the destruction of other people’s produce. Here Veblen describes an irrationally motivated consumerism as domineering production, anticipating the consumerist revolution diagnosed for the 1980s (e.g. Abercrombie 1990). But as seen he also reminds us of the function wasteful consumption fulfils as a mode of demonstrating a legitimate position within the social order of production. Finally, albeit against the backdrop of a Veblenian consideration even romantic consumerism is neither totally beyond ‘positional’ consumption nor totally beyond ‘productionism’; both labels only insufficiently describe his theory.
Veblen also identifies a longing of the contemporary consumer citizen to escape the double treadmill of industrial rationalization and invidious comparisons. This longing, however, is not totally disconnected from production; the escape needs to be facilitated by increased industrial efficiency and a redistribution of time, and it always runs the danger of being reversed into a practice of conspicuous leisure.
Although Veblen was most suspicious of consumerism, he can also be seen as an advocate for leisure and consumption liberated from both the immediate imperative of reproduction of labour power and the race for status recognition. Rather than being the Protestant high priest of utility as who he was portrayed by many of the Frankfurt School (Tilman 1999), he would, I think, have been able to subscribe to Adorno’s assertion that
‘only by virtue of opposition to production, as still not wholly encompassed by this order, can men bring about another more worthy of human beings. Should the appearance of life, which the sphere of consumption itself defends for such bad reasons, be once entirely effaced, then the monstrosity of absolute production will triumph.’ (1974: 15)
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^1	  It is an irony of the ‘expressivist turn’ (Taylor 1989: 368ff.) in modern culture that the growing importance of the inner life of the self at the same time opens it up to social scrutiny. 
